Abstract

A New Kind Of Positivism

§1 I present the premises of my research program.

§2 In the course of the discussion I shall defend Rudolf Carnap, praise Charles Sanders Peirce and challenge Alan Turing, arguing finally for a new kind of positivism^note:1; one founded upon a model that meets the expectations of Carnap's liberal physicalism^(ref.1) and is supported by biophysical evidence.

§4 In his seminal paper Computing Machinery and Intelligence^(ref.2) Alan Turing observed:

§6 This neglect or mystification of manifest qualities^note:2 is taken further by contemporary authors Stephen Wolfram and Gregory Chaitin. Wolfram states^(ref.3) a “Principle of Computational Equivalence,”^note:3 a common though flawed extension of Turing's position, and Chaitin has suggested^(ref.4) mystifying breaks in the chain of functional dependence^note:4. Meanwhile, the apparent confirmation in quantum mechanics of a certain non-locality, and conceptual failures in the physical sciences^{(ref.5)note:5}, has led the fringe to draw associations that, some will argue, are no less reasonable.

§11 Certain contemporary philosophers have rejected manifest qualities entirely, leaving us to face the necessary suspicion that there may indeed be Zombies among us. Yet, in contradiction, we are confronted by the expectations of populist computer science that machines will “awaken,” and that in doing so there will be born an intelligence more capable and more profound than our own.

§12 These breaks with traditional rigor have allowed the resurgence of pseudoscience and old-fashioned metaphysics; they are desperate and they are dangerous.

§13 It is a surprising and remarkable fact that we can indeed imbue computing machinery with aspects of our intelligent behavior, but this is not sufficient to explain the presence of manifest qualities, of what we will call experience. Turing never asserted that it was.

§14 I will focus upon the historical analysis that illustrates our neglect of the issue. Essentially arguing that while the Turing model has given us much to celebrate, we've become distracted by its success. This point will, I hope, sow the seeds for a realization that there are identifiable limits to Turing's model.

§15 I will then introduce the premises of a new model^(ref.6), one in which the basis of manifest qualities, experience, plays a role in the world, in the formation of physical structures and their behavior^note:6. I will argue that the failure of past models to identify such a role is a failure in the foundations of science. I look to evidence in biophysics to support the model.

§17 The presented model has broad explanatory powers. It provides an account of the introduction of complexity into the world, it contributes to evolutionary theory and informs medicine^note:7. The model has implications for the Foundations of Logic that extend to the Foundations of Mathematics. It also provides the basis for the construction of a new logical machinery, a proof of the theoretical model in practice, and the development of machines that experience, capable of recognition and motility.

§19 I will discuss the development of the model, its current status and remaining challenges; in particular I will discuss the challenges that formalizing the model present.

♦

End Notes

^note:1 In this work I take “positivism” to refer to a rejection of supernatural solutions and the pursuit of a constructive unified science. Whereas, I take “empiricism” to be a focus upon what is observed. While positivism requires empiricism, empiricism has not required positivism. I further take this to be a strength of positivist inquiry and a weakness of empiricism in isolation.

^note:2 I refer here to the manifest qualities associated with the lack of locality that Turing observes and is presumably readily observed by each of us. It is most obvious in any visual scene of some complexity. It should be readily apparent that the variety of visual stimuli do not reduce to a point.

^note:3 Abbreviated “PCE” by Wolfram, essentially states that everything is functionally reducible to Turing computation and that nothing is lost in such a reduction.

^note:4 “When you go to a higher level, the lower level may be irrelevant.” Gregory Chaitin, Conversations with a Mathematician, 2002.

^note:5 I am not referring here to the wide criticism of String Theory but noting, in agreement with Smolin, the willingness to diverge from the unity of science and accept, as sound, ungrounded solutions.

^note:6 The role we will present has not previously been considered. It is an affective, non-interactive, role based upon the simple presence of the basis of experience, against which physical structures can be assembled.

^note:7 By providing a new account of the mechanisms of sense and motility.

Concepts

experience: “Experience” is here the basis of consciousness. It is that which is most familiar. It is the common property of all senses. It is the first thing and the last thing for each of us. Though strictly, according to the model we will present, the first and the last thing for each of us is a sense; the primitive we will propose, characterized by physiology.

liberal physicalism: Liberal physicalism, contrary to “materialism” or “identity theory” (sometimes called “type physicalism”), argues that the laws and principles of physics must necessarily be extended to encompass a natural explanation of experience in nature as we discover more about perception. It is a view that allows for new discovery and was advocated by Rudolf Carnap.

References

Chaitin, Gregory. Conversations with a Mathematician. Springer[P.151] (2002). ISBN:1852335491. ^(ref:4)

Chaitin, Gregory. Conversations with a Mathematician. Springer[P.151] (2002). ISBN:1852335491. ^(ref:7)

Ericsson-Zenith, Steven. Explaining Experience in Nature: The Foundations of Logic and Apprehension. IN PREPARATION (2008). ^(ref:6)

Schlipp, Paul Arthur (Ed). The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap: The Library of Living Philosophers. Open Court (1963). ^(ref:1)

Smolin, Lee. The Trouble With Physics. Houghton-Mifflin (2006). ISBN:0618551050. ^(ref:5)

Turing, Alan. Computing machinery and intelligence. Oxford University Press, [Vol.59, No. 236][P.433-460] (October, 1950). ^(ref:2)

Wolfram, Stephen. A New Kind of Science. Wolfram Media (2002). ISBN:1579550088. ^(ref:3)